Strategy is essential for all these ends since dependence on, and use of, space is accelerating globally and space is integrated in the fabric of activities across all sectors and uses. This volume identifies a number of areas of concern pertinent to the development of national space strategy, including: intellectual foundations; political challenges; international cooperation and space governance; space assurance and political, organizational, and management aspects specific to security space strategy.
The contributing authors expand their focus beyond that of the United States, and explore and analyse the international developments and implications of national space strategies of Russia, China, Europe, Japan, India, Israel, and Brazil. This book will be of much interest to students of space power and politics, strategic studies, foreign policy and International Relations in general. Space Strategy in the 21st Century: Theory and Policy This book offers an overview of space strategy in the 21st century.
- Theory and Policy, 1st Edition.
- 5 Simple Things to Have a Happy Marriage.
- Contemporary Global Politics | IBEI;
- Space Strategy in the 21st Century: Theory and Policy?
- Some Day Somebody: La Fleur de Love: Book One;
Other formats. Ebook Space Strategy in the 21st Century. Bookshelf Space Strategy in the 21st Century. Perceived airpower failures in the counter-insurgency COIN fights of Iraq and Afghanistan, and now the campaign against ISIS, have more to do with a lack of national strategy and artificial constraints applied to airpower employment than the failure of EBO. The Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya regimes fell within a matter of weeks, and airpower played a major role in each of these conflicts. Failures in national strategy to fight insurgencies in these nations should not be blamed on EBO.
A concept based on tactics or technology is interesting, but only when paired with a concept of operations can it become compelling. Hypersonic weapons and swarms of mini-drones are only effective if the shooter knows where the target and its defenses are.
New Realities in Foreign Affairs: Diplomacy in the 21st Century
These types of capabilities require decision-quality intelligence, which is derived from the rapid collection, fusion, analysis, and delivery of information. General Deptula, the author of EBO, explained how war is changing, the criticality of information to military operations, and the role of aerospace forces in this new type of twenty-first century warfare:. As we move further into the twenty-first century, new aerospace capabilities will create a paradigm shift in the role that aircraft play in warfare emphasis added.
ICO focuses on the importance of not only collected information, but also the speed required to fuse, analyze, and deliver intelligence derived from that raw information. Air, space, and cyberspace forces play a critical role in the collection, fusing, analysis, and propagation of this information to the joint force, the command and control C2 of operations using this finished intelligence, and the weapons, both operational and developmental, that will allow the application of kinetic and non-kinetic effects at the right time and place to dominate the adversary.
ICO should not drive USAF or joint forces away from traditional methods of employment such as maneuver warfare, rather it is designed to provide context to this new type of conflict. Each of these pillars has been the recent subject of intense discussion among airpower theorists and practitioners. Unfortunately, few have attempted to link these vital functions into an overarching airpower strategy. Information dominance has both a positive component, collecting and accurately analyzing information on the adversary, and a negative component, denying the adversary the ability to do the same.
C2 has always been a core competency of the Air Force, and is central to ensuring operations are synchronized, coordinated, and executed safely and effectively. Of late, Air Force officials have begun to stress the need to conduct C2 in the multiple dimensions of conflict, to include space and cyberspace. EBO is still a valid methodology for airpower employment, but effects must be delivered in an ever-shortening timeline.
Space Strategy in the 21st Century: Theory and Policy – Bóksalan
In an era of mobile targets, intelligence is perishable and targets are fleeting. Once a target is identified, an effect must be deployed quickly or the intelligence is useless. Central to ICO is the ability to turn collected information into actionable intelligence. Speed and tempo play a key role in Information Dominance. Hallion noted current and future wars will be decided more by the timely distribution of intelligence than the actual collection of that intelligence. Hallion focuses on the speed component of Information Dominance, the ability to rapidly build and disseminate an accurate picture of the operational environment.
The force of the near future needs to be sensor agnostic and target-centric. Such a decision might be at the operational level, allowing a commander to apportion forces for desired effects, or it might be at the tactical level, providing operators with multi-domain situational awareness and targeting solutions. It is here where a new airpower strategy that focuses on the importance of information will pay huge dividends. All Air Force operators, whether they are fighter, bomber, ISR aircrew, intelligence, cyber, or space personnel, will understand the role they play in achieving Information Dominance that will be the critical first step to winning future conflicts.
Unfortunately, much of the force does not understand how MDC2 is any different than how they employ now, and for many it is simply another catchphrase that lacks meaning. Information derived from assets in each domain is fused, analyzed, and disseminated to the air component and the joint force.
C2 forces are responsible for the quick and accurate dissemination of this information to the warfighter for prosecution of a target s. The OODA loop describes how individuals, units, and nations make decisions.
We must be able to overwhelm the enemy. MDC2 takes the fused and analyzed operational picture developed from information acquired in all the dimensions of war, and ensures its distribution to the forces that can use the finished intelligence. As previously described, EBO presents a theory of airpower employment that maximizes the effect of U. Central to any future near-peer conflict is the method US forces will use to find and eliminate mobile targets, known colloquially as the kill chain.
Introduction: Following the Wrong Track or Walking on Stepping Stones – Which Way for Diplomacy?
The F2T2EA kill chain is a valuable tool to apply effects to a mobile target, but it is often employed in an overly regimented manner. Air Force and joint practitioners have frequently used the F2T2EA kill chain as a linear process that must be executed in a sequential pattern.
This linear mindset is outdated; often the steps will occur out of order, or multiple steps can be accomplished at once. In this case the track occurs before the find. Additionally, advanced platforms can execute multiple steps simultaneously, and even complete the entire F2T2EA kill chain independently. JP fails to provide this context to the kill chain, and one could easily see an inexperienced operator treating the F2T2EA kill chain as a checklist that must be executed sequentially to destroy a target.
A proper understanding of the current kill chain provides the agility needed to account for developing sensors and weapons that will continue to shrink the kill chain timeline, such as hypersonic weapons, and weapons that are re-targetable in flight. An agile understanding of the F2T2EA kill chain would alleviate concerns about the process being overly regimented and ineffective against non-linear systems.